unwanted embryos. Their argument fails: it involves at least two and possibly three logicalfallacies. Ifthe destruction ofembryos is to bejustified an alternative argument will have to befound.
Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer address a moral problem arising from human in vitro fertilisation: 'what if more eggs have been fertilised than can be reimplanted ... can these excess embryos simply be tipped down the sink' (1)? While this is a somewhat special problem, it has obvious connections with the morality of abortion and this gives their discussion a much wider relevance.
The answer which they offer is that there is no moral obstacle to the destruction of unwanted embryos. In support of this judgement they produce a somewhat diffuse argument which I reconstruct below, bracketing the premises which are not explicit in their discussion. In the crucial paragraph dealing with the potential of the egg and the sperm, we had in mind the egg and the sperm when separate, but considered jointly. Perhaps we should have said so explicitly, or written of 'the potential of the-egg-and-the-sperm', so as to rule out alternative interpretations; but we thought the context made our meaning clear.
It may help to re-state this context. We had just been telling some imaginary stories. In the first of these stories the doctors working on an IVF programme had obtained a fertile egg from a patient and some semen from the patient's husband. They were just about to drop the semen into the glass dish containing the egg when they learned the patient had a medical condition which made pregnancy impossible. They therefore tipped the egg and the semen, separately, down the sink. (Nothing wrong here, Scarlett would apparently admit.) In the second story, the bad news is brought after the semen has been tipped into the glass dish, and fertilisation has already taken place. The couple do not wish to donate the embryo to another couple. Would it now be wrong to tip the contents of the glass dish down the sink? It was against this background that we compared the potential of the embryo with 'the potential of the egg and sperm', and we assumed it was apparent that by the latter phrase we meant the potential of what the doctors were tipping down the sink in the first story, that is, the collective potential of the separate gametes.
Once our meaning has been grasped it is easy to see that Scarlett's cases A and B are irrelevant to our argument. We are not suggesting that a part ofa whole, considered on its own, has the potential of the whole. To change case A to make it parallel to our argument, the case would have to read: 
